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THE EROSION OF CITIZENSHIP:
ROGERS v. BELLEI1
Citizenship is a venerable concept, dating back to the nascent
stages of sovereign entities.2 To most of us it is a cherished right.
As such, government attempts to abrogate it have been subjected to
rigid judicial scrutiny and, in recent years, various congressional attempts to unilaterally revoke citizenship have been ruled unconstitutional. 3 In Rogers v. Bellei,4 however, the United States Supreme
Court, by a five to four vote, ruled that an individual who received an
automatic congressional grant of citizenship at birth, but who was
born outside the United States, may lose his citizenship for failure to
fulfill any reasonable residence requirements which Congress may
impose as a condition subsequent to that citizenship.
Plaintiff Aldo Mario Bellei was born in Italy on December 22,
1939, of an Italian father and an American mother. He became a
naturalized citizen of the United States at birth by virtue of section 1993 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, as amended in 1934, 5 which
conferred citizenship upon any child born outside the United States
of only one American parent. This type of naturalized citizenship
is known as jus sanguinis6 or "naturalization by descent." In order
for the child to qualify for and retain such citizenship under the 1934
amendments, the American parent must have resided in the United
States at some time prior to the child's birth, and the child himself
must reside in the United States continuously for five years prior to his
1. 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
2. Cf. Gordon, The Citizen and the State: Power of Congress to Expatriate
American Citizens, 53 GEo. L.J. 315, 316 (1965). See also Hurst, Can Congress
Take Away Citizenship?,29 RocKY MT. L. REv. 62, 64 (1956):
[Citizenship) is the right to be here; to stay in the United States, a country
where constitutional limitations make a person free from the oppressive hand of an
arbitrary and tyrannical government, that gives United States citizenship its real
and abiding value. This right to belong, this right to stay, connotes a permanent
membership in a state composed of free people. ,.
3. See, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S.
163 (1964); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958).
4. 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
5. Id. at 818. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1, 48 Stat. 797, amending Act of
April 19, 1866, Rev. Stat. § 1993 (1874).
6. "By right of blood, lure sanguinis, a child at birth may acquire the nationality of
a parent." 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY
THE UNITED STATES 1073 (2d rev. ed. 1945) [hereinafter cited as HYDE].
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Following plaintiff's birth, however, statutes

were enacted in 1940 and 1952 liberalizing the conditions to be met

for acquisition and retention of citizenship through jus sanguinis.
These statutes were expressly made applicable to any children born
abroad subsequent to 1934. 7 Bellei was therefore entitled to take advantage of their provisions. Under the terms of the most recent statute, section 301(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
a child born outside of the United States is declared to be a national
and a citizen of the United States at birth, providing that one of his parents is an American citizen who has been physically present in the
United States for at least ten years prior to the birth of such child."
The act further states in section 301(b) that the "301(a) citizen"

shall lose his nationality and citizenship unless he spends at least
five years continuously in the United States between the ages of four-

teen and twenty-eight.9

This condition subsequent, although sub-

stantial, is less burdensome than the conditions existing at the time of

Bellei's birth, and therefore represents the minimum criterion which
Bellei had to satisfy under the naturalization statutes.
Bellei never established a residence in the United States.

However,

as an American citizen, he travelled under an American passport and
registered with the Selective Service System. 10 When he renewed his
passport in 1961 at age 21, he was warned of the residence, requirements of section 301(b). In 1963, the year by which it was

necessary for him to have begun five years residence in the United
States in order to comply with the section,:" he was granted a passport
7. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 201(h), 54 Stat. 1139; Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (1970).
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1970). Bellei's mother satisfied this parental residence
requirement. 401 U.S. at 817-18.
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1970). Pub. L. 85-316, 8 U.S.C. § 1401b (1970), enacted in September, 1957, provides that absences of less than 12 months in the aggregate "shall not be considered to break the continuity ,of . . . [the] physical presence"
required by § 301(b).
10. 401 U.S. at 819. On December 11, 1963, Bellei was asked to report for induction. Induction was, however, deferred because of Bellei's NATO defense program employment. After February 14, 1964, Bellei was informed by the Selective Service by
letter that he had no further obligation for military service because of his loss of
citizenship. Id. at 819-20.
11. To complete a full five years residence prior to age twenty-eight, Bellei would
have had to begin residence in the United States prior to attaining age twenty-three oil
December 22, 1962. However, since absences aggregating less than twelve months
are allowed (see note 9 supra) and since Bellei claimed to have begun his five year
residence during a short visit to the United States in 1962 (Bellei v. Rusk, 296 F. Supp.
1247, 1248 (D.D.C. 1969); see 401 U.S. at 818-19), the crucial year for residence
purposes was actually 1963.
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extension until February, 1964.12 When he failed to return to the
United States by that date, he was informed by the State Department
that he was no longer a citizen of the United States.' 3
Bellei then brought an action against the Secretary of State to enjoin the enforcement of section 301(b)," contending that it violated
the protection of citizenship found by the courts in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.' 5 A three-judge district court agreed with
Bellei's Fifth Amendment contention and granted the requested injunction.'
On direct appeal, however, the Supreme Court reversed
the lower court's decision and upheld the State Department's revocation of Bellei's citizenship.' 7
12. Bellei v. Rusk, 296 F. Supp. 1247, 1248 (D.D.C. 1969).
13. Id.
14. Although Bellei probably could have insisted upon the application of the requirements of the 1934 Act, he did not do so, presumably since its restrictions are
even stricter than those in the 1952 Act. See text -accompanying notes 6-9 supra.
15. 296 F. Supp. at 1249. Bellei also relied upon the Eighth and Ninth Amendments. The Ninth Amendment merely states that the rights of the people are not
limited to those specifically enumerated in the Constitution. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 492 (1965). The Eighth Amendment proscribes the imposition of
cruel and unusual punishments. See note 17 infra.
16. Bellei v. Rusk, 296 F. Supp. 1247, 1249 (D.D.C. 1969).
17. 401 U.S. at 836. The Bellei Court never considered whether revocation of
Bellei's citizenship was a violation of the Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel
and unusual punishment. However, as established in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958), this is another constitutional concept deemed protective of citizenship. In
Trop the statute under consideration provided for expatriation only after a conviction
by a court-martial for desertion during time of war. The plurality opinion concluded
that since the statute produced statelessness it inflicted cruel and unusual punishment.
Id. at 101. However, statelessness was not an issue in Bellei because the plaintiff
possessed Italian as well as American citizenship. 401 U.S. at 818. Thus, the absence
of the penalty which so shocked the Trop- Court would greatly weaken Bellei's claim of
cruel and unusual punishment.
Before the Eighth Amendment claim can be reached, moreover, there is the question
of whether the expatriation statute can even be considered to be punitive. The determination of this issue in the past "has been extremely difficult and elusive of solution." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963). There, the Court,
in finding the particular expatriation to be an additional punishment for draft evasion
which could only be inflicted, if at all, after compliance with certain basic procedural
safeguards, listed several factors bearing upon the issue of 'punitiveness:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has
historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a
finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies
is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often
point in differing directions. Absent conclusive evidence of congressional intent
as to the penal nature of a statute, these factors must be considered in relation to
the statute on its face. Id. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
If the statute is found to be punitive in nature, punishment cannot be imposed without
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The resolution of Bellei's claim depended upon the Court's interpretation of the sources and nature of United States citizenship. 18
One may acquire United States citizenship either by birth in the United
States or through the process of naturalization."0 Citizenship by birth
in the United States derives from the common law concept of jus soli,
which declares that the place of birth governs citizenship, a concept
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.2 0

On the other hand, citi-

zenship by naturalization derives from Congress' power under Article I
of the Constitution to enact a "uniform rule of naturalization."'' 2 Through
naturalization, an alien acquires the nationality of the naturalizing
state. 22 Naturalization as heretofore used by the Court has been con-

sidered to be a unitary concept encompassing any mode of acquiring
citizenship other than by jus soli. The rights and privileges of citizenship were not thought to depend upon the particular source or

method of naturalization.

However, the Court in Bellei treated jus

sanguinis as a third category of citizenship, which, as will be seen,
compliance with the procedural safeguards of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
Id. at 167. Upon an evaluation and application of the above cited factors to the instant case, it seems quite clear that section 301(b) is not punitive in nature. No
scienter is required by the section. It does not on its face tend to promote retribution
or punishment; the behavior to which it applies is not already a crime; a rational
alternative purpose exists (acculturation of the 'individual-see text accompanying
notes. 114-16 infra); and the. alternative purpose could seemingly only be achieved
by the residence requirements.
18. For a definition of citizenship see note 2 supra. While the Immigration and
Nationality Act fails to define "citizen" or "citizenship," a definition of "national"
is afforded therein:
The term "national" means a person owing permanent allegiance to a state.
The term "national of the United States" means (A) a citizen of the United
States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes
permanent allegiance to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(21)-(22)
(1970).
See also W. BISHOP, INTRNATIONAL LAw 394-95 (2d ed. 1962); 1 OPPENHEIM, INrTRNATONAL LAw 644-45 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht transl. 1955) [hereinafter cited as
OPPENHEIMI; HYDE, supra note 6, at 1066-67 (footnote omitted):
Citizenship, as distinct from nationality, is a creature solely of domestic law.
It refers to rights which a State sees fit to confer upon certain individuals who are
also its nationals. When the Constitution or laws of the United States declare
that persons born under specified circumstances, or changing their allegiance by
certain processes, shall become citizens of the United States, citizenship may
be truly regarded as a source of American nationality; for the citizen of the
United States is necessarily also a national of the United States. It is to be observed, however, that the United States claims as nationals numerous persons
upon whom it has not conferred the status of citizens of the United States.
19. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1; 8 U.S.C. 9H 1421-59 (1970).
20. Weedin r.Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 660 (1927); United States v. Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 674 (1898). See HYDE, supra note 6, at 1068-73.
21. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S.' 649, 672
(1898).
22. OPPENHEiM, supra note 18, at 654; see HYDn, supra note 6, at 1087.
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does not confer the same rights as citizenship either by birth within the
United States or by naturalization after immigration.
The Court's current involvement with questions concerning Congress' power to unilaterally revoke an individual's United States citizenship began with its 1958 decision in Perez v. Brownell. 3 Perez was a
native-born United States citizen who, by virtue of his birth in 1909 to
Mexican parents, was also a citizen of Mexico.2 4 His parents removed him to Mexico around 1920.25 He was denied admission as
a United States citizen in 1947 on the grounds that he had remained
outside of the United States to avoid service in the armed forces and
that he had voted in an election in Mexico, both of which activities
result in a loss of citizenship under the Nationality Act of 1940.26
Finding it unnecessary to deal with the draft evasion issue, the Court
held that Perez had expatriated himself by voting in a foreign political
election. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, concluded
that "in making voting in foreign elections (among other behavior)
an act of expatriation, Congress was seeking to effectuate its power to
regulate foreign affairs." 27 The Court agreed that the government's inherent foreign affairs power is applicable in the citizenship area,
noting further that the Necessary and Proper Clause permits the
congressional exercise of this power whenever a "rational nexus" exists between it and the object sought to be achieved by the statute in issue.28 In the Perez case, then, the question was: "Is the means,
withdrawal of citizenship, reasonably calculated to effect the end that
is within the power of Congress to achieve, the avoidance of embarrassment in the conduct of our foreign relations . . . ?
Given such
an expansive test, Justice Frankfurter found little difficulty in upholding Congress' power to revoke the United States citizenship of a person who voted in a foreign election. Moreover, the Court refused to
look to the intentions of the individual to determine the voluntariness
of the expatriation, stating that the "essential significance [of prior
case law] is . . . [a] rejection of the notion that the power of Congress to terminate citizenship depends upon the citizen's assent."30
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
States

356 U.S. 44 (1958).
Id. at 46.
Id.
8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5), (10) (1970).
356 U.S. at 57.
18.
Id. at 58-60; see U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl.
356 U.S. at 60.
Id. at 61; see, e.g., Ex parte Griffin, 237 F. 445, 453 (N.D.N.Y. 1916) (United
citizen who joined the Canadian army deemed to have voluntarily expatriated
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Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices Black and Douglas in dis-

sent, maintained that citizenship cannot be taken from lawfully naturalized and native-born citizens.31 Fundamental to the Chief Justice's argument was the concept that the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment affords absolute protection of the citizenship
which it defines.

Citizenship, he noted, is a constitutionally created

right, whereas expatriation is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution. 2
He also stressed the importance of the fact that, in the United States,
the people are sovereign:
Whatever may be the scope of its powers to regulate the conduct and
affairs of all persons within its jurisdiction, a government of the people cannot take away their citizenship simply because one branch of
that government can be said to have a conceivably rational basis
for wanting to do so.3s

That Perez was a significant victory for the government is incontrovertible, yet a slight shift in emphasis led to a contrary result in
4
another decision handed down the very same day. In Trop v. Dulles,8
Justice Brennan switched sides and joined a five justice majority that
invalidated a different expatriation statute.3 5 The petitioner, a United
himself): "When he [the citizen] voluntarily does acts which the law says operate as
expatriation, we have the necessary assent."
31. 356 U.S. at 66.
32. Id. at 65-66. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, wrote another dissent
attacking the majority for taking a position contrary to our constitutional heritage.
Id. at 79. Justice Douglas, as had the Chief Justice, noted that nowhere is expatriation
mentioned in the Constitution. Id. In his opinion the decision allowed Congress to
brand an ambiguous act as a "voluntary renunciation" of citizenship without a finding that the citizen had transferred his loyalty from this country to another. Id. at 80.
33. Id. at 65. Justice Douglas expressed concern for the possible effect this concept
could have in other areas:
[hIf the power to regulate foreign affairs can be used to deprive a person of his
citizenship because he voted abroad, why may not it be used to deprive him of
his citizenship because his views on foreign policy are unorthodox or because he
disputed the position of the Secretary of State or denounced a Resolution of the
Congress or the action of the Chief Executive in the field of foreign affairs? Id.
at 81-82.
In a separate dissent Justice Whittaker, although agreeing "that Congress may expatriate a citizen for an act which it may reasonably find to be fraught with danger
of embroiling our Government in an international dispute or of embarrassing it in
the conduct of foreign affairs . . . ." felt that the statutes as applied to the facts of this
case proscribed conduct with minimal foreign affairs consequences. Id. at 84-85.
34. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
35. Id. at 88, invalidating 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8) (1970), which provides for loss
of citizenship for wartime desertion. (Despite the Court's holding, the statute remains codified.) Justices Black, Douglas, and Whittaker joined Chief Justice Warren's
opinion, while separate concurring opinions were written by Justice Black and Justice
Brennan. The dissenters were Justices Frankfurter, Burton, Clark, and Harlan.
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States citizen by birth, was convicted of wartime desertion while serving in the United States Army in French Morocco. 36 He was denied
a passport in 1952, having, under section 401(g) of the Nationality
Act of 1940,17 lost his citizenship by reason of his conviction and
resulting dishonorable discharge.38 Chief Justice Warren, this time
writing for the majority, distinguished Perez on the grounds that:
The purpose of taking away citizenship from a convicted deserter is
simply to punish him. There is no other legitimate purpose that the
statute could serve. Denationalization in this case is not even claimed
to be a means of solving international problems, as was argued in
Perez.39
The majority rejected the argument of the dissenting justices, who
would have sustained the withdrawal of citizenship from a deserter
as a valid exercise of Congress' war power. 40 Finally, the Chief Justice concluded that the punishment was "cruel and unusual" since it
forced Trop into a situation of statelessness, which results in the
complete destruction of a citizen's status in organized society. 4 ' Trop,
then, indicated that Congress' power to expatriate, recognized in Perez,
would be subjected to careful judicial scrutiny so as to properly define
its limitations.
In Schneider v. Rusk4 1 a significant change in philosophy from the
Perez decision occurred. Section 352(a)(1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 provided for expatriation of naturalized citizens who resided continuously for three years in the nation of their
birth or former nationality.4 3 In a five to three decision Justice
Douglas, speaking for the majority, condemned this statutory distinction between natural-born and naturalized citizens, holding the statute violative of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause:44
This statute proceeds on the impermissible assumption that naturalized citizens as a class are less reliable and bear less allegiance to
this country than do the native born. This is an assumption that
is impossible for us to make. Moreover, while the Fifth Amend36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

356 U.S. at 87-88.
8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8) (1970).
356 U.S. at 88.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 121-22.
Id. at 101.
377 U.S. 163 (1964).
Congressionally preserved as 8 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(1) (1970).
377 U.S. at 168-69.
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ment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimina'45
tion that is "so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process."
The statute was invalidated despite the contentions of the dissenters
that the petitioner had voluntarily expatriated herself40 and that the

majority decison would cause grave problems in the conduct of for47
eign affairs.
The change in philosophy reflected in the decisions subsequent to
Perez climaxed in 1967 with the overruling of Perez by Afroyim v.
Rusk.
The petitioner in Afroyim was a naturalized United States

citizen who voted in an Israeli political election in 1951.1

His ap-

plication for a United States passport was denied in. 1960 on the

ground that he had lost his citizenship by voting in a foreign election
in contravention of section 401(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940.0
The Court was thus faced with a fact situation substantially identical
to Perez, giving it the opportunity to reconsider whether Congress can

enact legislation stripping an American of his citizenship without his
voluntary renunciation of the same. 1 Justice Black, writing the majority opinion in this five to four decision, adopted the approach of

the dissenting justices in Perez:
[W]e reject the idea expressed in Perez that, aside from the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has any general power, express or implied, to take away an American citizen's citizenship without his assent. This power cannot, as Perez indicated, be sustained as an implied attribute of sovereignty possessed by all nations. . . . In our
country the people are sovereign and the Government cannot sever
its relationship to the people by taking away their citizenship.5 2
45. Id. at 168, quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
46. Justice Clark concluded that the appellant had had statutory notice of the requirement, had disregarded the statute for eight years and intended to continue to do
so, and thus had renounced her citizenship. 377 U.S. at 170.
47. The action of the Court in voiding these expatriations will cause no end of
difficulties because thousands of persons living throughout the world will come
under the broad sweep of the Court's decision. It is estimated that several thousand of these American expatriates reside in iron curtain countries alone.....
The protection of American citizens abroad has always been a most sensitive
matter and continues to be so today. This is especially true in Belgium, Greece,
France, Iran, Israel, Switzerland and Turkey, because of their refusal to recognize the expatriation of their nationals who acquire American citizenship. The
dissension that springs up in some of these areas adds immeasurably to the
difficulty. Id. at 173-74.
48. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
49. Id. at 254.
50. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401(e), 54 Stat. 1169, congressionally preserved as 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (5) (1970).
51. 387 U.S. at 256.
52. Id. at 257.
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Justice Black held that the Fourteenth Amendment independently protects the citizenship which it defines from forcible destruction by Congress. 8 Justice Harlan, writing for the dissenters, insisted that the
majority had failed to overcome the reasoning of Perez, taking particular issue with the majority's reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment:
The Citizenship Clause . . . neither denies nor provides to Congress
any power of expatriation; its consequences are, for present purposes,
exhausted by its declaration of the classes of individuals to whom
citizenship initially attaches. Once obtained, citizenship is of course
protected from arbitrary withdrawal by the constraints placed around
Congress' powers by the Constitution; it is not proper to create from
the Citizenship Clause an additional, and entirely unwarranted, restriction upon legislative authority. 54
The Afroyim decision declared that citizenship, once granted, is an
absolute right which is beyond the power of Congress to revoke in the
absence of the consent of the citizen. It has long been the rule, however, that the initial grant of citizenship through naturalization is in
the nature of a privilege, rather than a constitutional right. 55 Congress, through its power to grant this privilege, may impose conditions precedent to the attainment of citizenship.5 6 Every United
57
States statute granting citizenship through the concept of jus sanguinis
has attached at least one condition precedent to the grant of citizenship,5 8 and all have required residence of a parent in the United States be53. Id. at 268.
54. Id. at 292-93.
55. See Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961) (petitioner, who was born in
1906 in Italy of the United States citizen mother and an Italian father and who resided
continuously in the United States since the year of his birth, nevertheless held not to
be a citizen of the United States-see text accompanying notes 76-82 infra); Weedin
v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657 (1927); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649,
674 (1898).
56. See Maney v. United States, 278 U.S. 17, 22 (1928) (affirmed cancellation of
illegally procured certificate of naturalization). See also Judge Leventhal's concurring
opinion in Bellei v. Rusk, 296 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1969): "My own assumption
is that Congress can impose reasonable conditions that must be met before citizenship
is recognized." Id. at 1253.
57. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
58. Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 104 (children born of citizen parents
outside the United States were to be considered natural born citizens, except that the
right of citizenship would not descend to persons whose fathers had never been resident in the United States); Act of January 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 415 (continued the provisions of the Act of 1790); Act of April 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 4, 2 Stat.
155 (continued the provisions of the Act of 1790 if the parent(s) acquired citizenship
prior to 1802); Act of February 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604, codified as Rev.
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fore such citizenship can vest in the foreign-born child."0

The dif-

ficult question presented to the Bellei Court, therefore, was whether
Congress has the power to establish conditions subsequent to the attain-

ment of citizenship by jus sanguinis. Congress required oaths of allegiance in its Acts of 1907 and 1934,60 and the Acts of 1934 and 1940
added five years residence in the United States as conditions subse-

quent.61

It is this type of condition that Bellei confronts, a type of con-

dition that has never been applied to the other categories of citizenship

and which would seem contrary to the principles enunciated in the
Afroyin decision.

The Bellei majority recognized the validity of the Afroyim and
Schneider decisions, 62 but distinguished them through a novel interpretation of the opening sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment,

which declares that "all persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United

States and of the State wherein they reside."0 3 The petitioner in
Schneider was a German national by birth and obtained her citizen4
ship by descent upon her mother's naturalization in the United States.
Although she did receive her citizenship by descent, as did Bellei,
she obtained that naturalization while physically present in the United

States. The plaintiff in Afroyim, a Polish national by birth, acquired
citizenship after immigration by naturalization in the United States.05
Stat. § 1993 (explicitly required citizenship as well as residence of the father; the act
applied retroactively to cover the gap since 1802); Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 6,
34 Stat. 1229 (all children born abroad who were citizens under § 1993 were required, if still abroad at age eighteen, to record their intention to become residents
and remain citizens of the United States, and to take an oath of allegiance at age
twenty-one); Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1, 48 Stat. 797 (eliminated paternal
citizenship requirement and, prospectively only, granted citizenship if at least one parent was a citizen; provided, however, that the child be subject to a five year continuous
residence requirement immediately prior to attaining age 18 and an oath of allegiance
within 6 months of attaining age 21 if one parent was an alien); Nationality Act of
1940, ch. 876, § 201(g), 54 Stat. 1139 (similar to Act of 1934, but residence provision
for child changed to require only a total of five years residence in the United
States between the ages of thirteen and twenty-one). See also Montana v. Kennedy,
366 U.S. 308 (1961).
59. See Weedin v.Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1927); note 58 supra.
60. Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 6, 34 Stat. 1229; Act of May 24, 1934, ch.
344, § 1, 48 Stat. 797. See note 58 supra.
61. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1, 48 Stat. 797; Nationality Act of 1940,
ch. 876, § 201(g), 54 Stat. 1139.
62. See 401 U.S. at 822-23, 827.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (emphasis added).
64. 377 U.S. at 164.
65. 387 U.S. at 254.
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Bellei, however, having never resided in the United States, became a
citizen by virtue of descent alone: 6 6
The central fact, in our weighing of the plaintiff's claim to continuing and therefore current United States citizenship, is that he was
born abroad. He was not born in the United States. He was not naturalized in the United States. And he has not been subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States. All this being so, it seems indisputable that the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment has
no application to plaintiff Bellei.67 He simply is not a FourteenthAmendment-first-sentence citizen.
Holding that Bellei's claim could not therefore be founded upon Fourteenth Amendment citizenship, the Court said it "must center in the
statutory power of Congress and in the appropriate exercise of that
power within the restrictions of any pertinent constitutional provisions other than the Fourteenth Amendment's first sentence." 68 Justice Blackmum quoted dictum from United States v. Wong Kim Ark60
for support:
"But it [the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment] has not
touched the acquisition of citizenship by being born abroad of American parents; and has left that subject to be regulated, as it had alby
ways been, by Congress, in the exercise of the power conferred
'70
the Constitution to establish an uniform rule of naturalization.
Justice Blackmun, having found congressional power to regulate
the acquisition of citizenship through jus sanguinis, next turned to
the constitutionality of the exercise of that power when used to impose
a condition subsequent to a grant of citizenship. 71 He applied a "reasonableness" standard in evaluating Congress' primary concern with
the dual nationality of persons in Bellei's position and found the residence requirement not unreasonable, 72 relying upon Weedin v. Chin
Bow 73 to demonstrate that Congress emphasized residence as "the
talisman of dedicated attachment" ' 74 in enacting the naturalization
statutes:
66. 401 U.S. at 818.
67. Id. at 827.
68. Id. at 828.
69. 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (child born in United States to Chinese alien parents is a
citizen by birth under the Fourteenth Amendment).
70. 401 U.S. at 830, quoting United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649,

688 (1898).
71.
72.
73.
74.

401 U.S. at 831.
Id. at 833-34.
274 U.S. 657 (1927).
401 U.S. at 834.
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It is not too much to say, therefore, that Congress at that time . . .
attached more importance to actual residence in the United States as
indicating a basis for citizenship than it did to descent from those
who had been born citizens of the colonies or of the states before the
Constitution. As said by Mr. Fish, when Secretary of State, to Minister Washburn, June 28, 1873, in speaking of this very proviso, "the
heritable blood of citizenship was thus associated unmistakenably with
residence within the country which was thus recognized as essential
'75
to full citizenship."
The Court found further support in Congress' conceded power to regulate the requisites of an initial grant of citizenship and pointed out
that no alien has a right to naturalization unless he complies with
all the statutory conditions precedent.7 6 Congress may even refuse
to enact any statute providing for the inheritance of citizenship by
jus sanguinis.77 Bellei could not complain if Congress had decided
to impose the five year residence requirement as a condition precedent to the grant of citizenship. The Court concluded that there is
no logic in reaching a different result when Congress has magnanimously structured the same requirement as a condition subsequent in
order to confer citizenship rights from the moment of birth."'
Justice Blackmun rejected the proposition that the condition subsequent created a "second-class citizenship," 79 reiterating that the
plaintiff's citizenship was initially fully deniable and that, once it had
been granted by Congress, it was equivalent in all respects to that
of any other citizen, save for a single condition of residence.8 0 He
noted that individuals in the plaintiff's situation (i.e., foreign-born
children of an alien father and a citizen mother) lacked recourse to
a claim to citizenship at all until 1934.1 When the scope of "naturalization by descent" was gratuitously expanded at that time to include
those persons whose maternal parent satisfied the parental citizenship
and residence requirements, Congress imposed only a minimal residence condition upon the descendant, a condition which Bellei had
failed to meet despite subsequent advantageous liberalizations in the
75. Id., quoting Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1927) (citations
omitted).
76. Id. at 830 (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 830.
78. Id. at 835.
79. The Court referred to the language "second-class citizenship" originating in
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 169 (1964), as a clich6, and noted that it "is too
handy and too easy, and, like most cliches, can be misleading." 401 U.S. at 835.
80. Id. at 836.
81. Id. at 826; see note 55 supra.
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law82 and despite numerous warnings.

Unlike the plaintiffs in Afro-

yim or Schneider, Bellei had never actually resided in the United
States, although he had visited it five times. 88 Indeed, Bellei had

been given every chance to attain United States citizenship, but had
simply not taken the opportunity while available. 84 Finally, the prob-

lems inherent in the creation of stateless persons discussed by Chief
Justice Warren in his Perez dissent and in Trop85 were absent, since

86
Bellei remained an Italian citizen.
The Bellei Court thus treated Afroyim's naturalization in the United

States as significant, and fashioned a strict interpretation of the Four-

teenth Amendment to hold that the Afroyim Court intended only to extend the protections of the amendment to the limited class of persons naturalized while physically present in the United States.87 The meager
discussion and analysis presented in the opinion authored by Justice
Blackmun provides little to sustain this interpretation of Afroyim. Jus-

tice Black, author of Afroyim, and Justice Brennan, who had concurred therein, dissented in Bellei.8 8 In seperate opinions, both derided

the failure of the majority to formulate a "rational basis" for segregating
for the purpose of Fourteenth Amendment protection those naturalized
in the United States from those naturalized while residing elsewhere."9
Both Justices were of the opinion that citizenship wherever obtained
came well within the scope of the Afroyim protection. In Afroyim,

Justice Black had considered whether Congress had any power, express or implied, to terminate American citizenship without the citi-

zen's consent.9"

He had rejected the argument that such a power

82. See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
83. 401 U.S. at 836.
84. Id. at 819-20, 836.
85. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, .64 (1958) (Warren, C.J. dissenting); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.s. 86 (1958). The Chief Justice in Trop eloquently described the
plight of the stateless person:
It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the
individual the political existence that was centuries in the development. The
punishment strips the citizen of his status in the national and international political
community. His very existence is at the sufferance of the country in which he
happens to find himself. While any one country may accord him some rights, and
presumably as long as he remained in this country he would enjoy the limited
rights of an alien, no country need do so because he is stateless. Furthermore,
his enjoyment of even the limited rights of an alien might be subject to termination
at any time by reason of deportation. In short, the expatriate has lost the right to
have rights. Id. at 101-02.
86. 401 U.S. at 836.
87. Id. at 827.
88. 401 U.S. at 836, 845.
89. Id. at 843, 845.
90. 387 U.S. at 257.
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is an implied attribute of sovereignty possessed by all nations, and
had stated expressly that "[i]n our country the people are sovereign
and the Government cannot sever its relationship to the people by
taking away their citizenship."'" He supported his position by reference to the "mature and well-considered dictum ' 92 of Chief Justice
93
Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of the United States:
[The naturalized citizen] becomes a member of the society, possessing
all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the view of the constitution, on the footing of a native. The constitution does not authorize Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power
of the national Legislature, is to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far as respects
the individual. 94
The Bellei majority, on the other hand, relied upon the distinguishable facts in Afroyim to the exclusion of the Afroyim majority's discussion and analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Justice Black
pointed out, the majority and dissenting Justices in Afroyim all appeared to have agreed that the scope of the Citizenship Clause does
reach all citizens.95 The language of Justice Black in Afroyim
strongly implies that it was the Court's view that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects no less a class than the entire class of citizens
referred to by prior legislative and judicial opinions. This view is
substantiated by the Afroyim Court's adoption of the language of
Senator Howard, a sponsor of the amendment, explaining the purpose of the clause:
It settles the great question of citizenship and removes all doubt as to
what persons are or are not citizens of the United States . . . . We
desired to put this question of citizenship . . . beyond the legislative
power.

....

96

Admittedly this was written with the Negro in mind, 9 7 but its adoption
by the Afroyim Court clearly denotes a view that the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection encompasses all citizens. It is clear that under
Afroyim there is only one kind of citizen, and a citizen who is not a
91. Id.
92. Id. at 261.
93. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
94. 387 U.S. at 261, quoting Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738, 827 (1924).
95. 401 U.S. at 842.
96. 387 U.S. at 263.
97. Justice Black in Afroyim stated: "[The] undeniable purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment [was] to make citizenship of Negroes permanent and secure ....
" 387
U.S. at 263.
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Fourteenth Amendment citizen simply does not exist. Yet this is
precisely the classification given citizen Bellei by Justice Blackmun. Under Afroyim there were but two classifications, citizen and non-citizen; under Bellei a third is added which represents a kind of quasicitizenship.
The Bellei Court attempted to avoid discussion of the Afroyim
opinion by narrowly interpreting the word "in" found in the Fourteenth Amendment Citizenship Clause to mean within the geographical limits of the United States. Bellei was not therefore born
"in" the United States, naturalized "in" the United States, nor subject to the geographical jurisdiction of the United States. Since
he did not fall within this stringent "in" classification, the Court permitted his citizenship to be stripped from him. Under Bellei the quality of citizenship may turn on the happenstance of nativity.
In the past, such a literal translation of the same word has not been
well received. The Supreme Court in Savorgnan v. United States9 8
expressly rejected any such debilitating interpretation:
One contention of the petitioner is the novel one that her naturalization did not meet the requirements of § 2 of the Act of 1907, because
it did not take place within the boundaries of a foreign state. The
answer is that the phrase in § 2 which states that "any American citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated himself when he has been naturalized in any foreign state in conformity with its laws . . ." refers
merely to naturalization into citizenship of any foreign state. It does
not refer to the place where the naturalization proceeding occurs. 99
While the majority in Bellei failed to confront this issue, Justice Black
noted that the word "in" found in the phrase "in the United States"
was meant to encompass the acquisition of citizenship either "by being
born within [the United States] or by being naturalized into it."'1 00
The Afroyim Court itself afforded the word "in" a comprehensive
meaning so as to include every citizen of the United States. 10
Proceeding from the conclusion that the plaintiff was not a Fourteenth Amendment citizen, the Bellei Court held that the condition subsequent imposed by section 301(b)10 2 was not unreasonable, arbitrary,
98. 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
99. Id. at 499 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added in part).
100. 401 U.S. at 843.
101. "We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does, protect
every citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship .. " 387 U.S. at 268 (emphasis added).
102. 8U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1970).
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or unlawful. 103 In so holding, the Court implied that a conceptual
distinction exists between expatriation on the one hand and a conditional grant of citizenship on the other. A tenuous basis for this distinction can be found in the structure of the statute itself. Section
301(b) 04 is not a 'Loss of Nationality" provision, but rather is
found in a chapter entitled "Nationality at Birth and Collective Naturalization." Unlike the "Loss of Nationality" sections, which are separated from those sections providing for grants of citizenship, this section is included within the grant of citizenship and is directly coupled
with that grant. In short, it could be said the "Loss of Nationality"
sections invalidated by Afroyim, Schneider, and their predecessors
are "expatriative" while the Bellei Court was concerned merely with a
conditional grant of citizenship. 0 5
However, the expatriative conditions established by Congress and
found unconstitutional in Afroyim and Schneider in fact appear no different in substance than the condition scrutinized in the instant case.
The three cases all involved conditions to be executed subsequent to
the acquisition of citizenship. The conditions are only distinguishable in that those considered in Afroyim and Schneider arose in a
negative context proscribing performance of the condition, 10 whereas
in Bellei the condition is in a positive context requiring performance
of the condition. Bellei's citizenship had already been granted, and
even if merely treated as a property right, rather than as a personal
and fundamental right, such right had vested. Thus, regardless of
how the citizenship was obtained, it would have been absolutely protected under Afroyim from unilateral revocation by government action, even if that action were not considered to be unreasonable, arbitrary or unlawful. The Afroyim Court recognized as exceptions only
those statutes which provide for revocation of naturalization unlawfully procured. 0 7 By relating back to an individual's state of mind at
the time of his naturalization 0 8 and prior to the grant of his citizenship,
these statutes purport to invalidate the grant of citizenship, thereby rendering Afroyim inapplicable. Bellei could not fall within this single
103. 401 U.S. at 831.
104. 8U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1970).

105. See 401 U.S. at 834-36.
106. 'The loss of nationality under this Part [Part Ill-Loss of Nationality] shall
result solely from the performance by a national of the acts or fulfillment of the
conditions specified in this Part." 8 U.S.C. § 1488 (1970).
107. 387 U.S. at 267 n.23.
108. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (1970).
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exception: his naturalization at birth precludes a showing of any of the
elements necessary to a finding of unlawful procurement.
Having purportedly distinguished the Afroyim decision, Justice
Blackmun proceeded to blithely ignore the broad due process principles enunciated in Schneider. The Schneider Court, as noted above,
had struck down a provision distinguishing between naturalized and
native born citizens as being contrary to the protection against unjustifiable discrimination found in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 10 9 Prior to Schneider the test for fulfillment of due
process requirements relating to citizenship was succinctly stated by
Justice Frankfurter in Perez as being whether "the means, withdrawal of citizenship, [is] reasonably calculated to effect [an] end
that is within the power of Congress to achieve ... ."no Schnei-

der, however, departed from the "rational nexus" test used by the
Perez Court and adopted instead a test balancing the plaintiffs
right to non-discriminatory treatment against the governmental inter109. See text accompanying notes 42-47 supra.
110. 356 U.S. at 60. The power of Congress to create reasonable classifications
consonant with due process has been widely affirmed. Justice Clark, in his dissent in
Schneider, 377 U.S. at 176-77, cited several examples: Hirabayshi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943) (curfew order restricting Japanese Americans during wartime held
not to be so discriminatory as to be a denial of due process); Ohio ex rel. Clarke v.
Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) (city ordinance prohibiting the issuance to aliens of
licenses to operate pool and billiard rooms does not violate the rights of aliens
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Terrance v.
Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) (state legislation withholding the right to own or lease
land for agricultural purposes from aliens who have not declared a good faith intention to become citizens of the United States is not violative of the Due Process or Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175
(1915) (state law that only citizens shall be employed on public works is not unconstitutional under the Privilege and Immunities Clause nor under the Equal Protection
or Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment). As the District of Columbia
Circuit stated in upholding the predecessor of the section invalidated by Schneider
(Act of October 14, 1940, ch. 4, § 404, 54 Stat. 1137):
[W]here classification has [a] reasonable relation to legitimate legislative ends and
is supported by considerations of policy and practical convenience, it is not arbitrary. The guaranty of due process demands only that a law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a
reasonable and substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained. Lapides
v. Clark, 176 F.2d 619, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949)
(citations omitted).
See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 584 (1937) (a tax imposed by the
Social Security Act upon employers of labor, but exempting employers of less than
eight, agricultural labor, and domestic service in private homes is not violative of
Fifth Amendment due process); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934)
(state regulation fixing different prices at which storekeepers and dealers may buy and
sell milk held consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because of the distinctions between the two classes of merchants).
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The Court recog-

nized that such a test had "equal protection" connotations, stating
that "while the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause,

it does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative
of due process.' "1112 Applying this "balancing test" to circumstances
strikingly similar to those in Bellei, the Schneider Court said:
A native-born citizen is free to reside abroad indefinitely without
suffering loss of citizenship. The discrimination aimed at naturalized
citizens drastically limits their rights to live and work abroad in a
way that other citizens may. It creates indeed a second-class citizen3
ship. 11
In Bellei the Court ignored Schneider's "balancing test;" instead

it applied the "rational nexus" test of Perez and concluded that the
imposition of the condition subsequent met the test since the condition (classification)

created by Congress is "reasonably related"

to purposes which are within the power of Congress to impose. Justice Blackmun found a two-fold purpose in the congressionally-created condition subsequent. He pointed first to the goal of maintaining a citizenry with undivided loyalty: "We cannot say that a concern that the child's own primary allegiance is to the country of his
1 4
birth and of his father's allegiance is either misplaced or arbitrary. "

Neither Afroyim nor Schneider had had occasion to weigh such a

policy in favor of acculturation, for the provisions struck down in those
cases affected citizens who either were born within or became naturalized after residency in this country." 15 In the instant case, how-

ever, the existence of a legitimate congressional concern regarding acculturation was conceded even by the three-judge district court which

had originally upheld Bellei's claim."

6

Justice Blackmun also felt

111. This balancing test is very similar to the test employed under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause in the First Amendment area. See, e.g., Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (denial of unemployment benefits because petitioner
would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith, was held to have abridged
her free exercise of religion); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (city tax
ordinance requiring lists with the names of the members of the local branches of the
N.A.A.C.P. was held to be an unjustified interference with the members' freedom of
association). Compare the balancing tests used in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965),
upholding federal restrictions on the Fifth Amendment "liberty of travel," and Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), holding different restrictions on travel to
be a violation of Fifth Amendment due process.
112. 377 U.S. at 168, citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
113. 377 U.S. at 168-69.
114. 401 U.S. at 832.
115. 387 U.S. at 254; 377 U.S. at 164.
116. "It is a legitimate concern of Congress that those who bear American citizen-
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that the statute had properly been enacted in an effort to alleviate the

problems created by the dual national between the governments claim-

ing his allegiance."17 In a statement that reveals the impact of the

"rational nexus" test the Court opined:
ship and receive its benefits have some nexus to the United States." 296 F. Supp. at
1252.
117. 401 U.S. at 832. The fact of "dual nationality" is an unpremeditated result of
the operation of the municipal law of two different sovereignties, made possible by
the absence of any generally accepted international "common law" on the subject.
3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, § 255 (1942); 3 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAw, § 425 (1906). Despite the fact that it is generally agreed to be undesirable for any person to have the nationality of more than one State at any one time, the
concept of dual nationality is now commonly recognized. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note
18, § 310. The dual national himself is burdened with the responsibilities of two
citizenships, and the resulting problems are a constant source of conflict between
States. See Barone, Dual Nationality: With ParticularReference to the Legal Status
of the Italo-American, 23 FORDHAM L. REv. 243, 263-76 (1954). There have been
some treaty arrangements controlling the matter of dual nationality, but such arrangements are not so widespread as to form a basis for recognizable international common
law. 3 HAcKwoRTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, § 242 (1942).
The Court asserts that Bellei's citizenship is revocable, and that in light of the policies
against dual nationality it should be revoked. At the very least, individuals in Bellei's
position should be required to make an election. 401 U.S. at 831-34, citing Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 187 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing
"entanglements which may stem from dual allegiance"); Kawakita v. United States,
343 U.S. 717, 723-36 (1952) (finding a dual citizen of the United States and Japan
guilty of treason for crimes perpetrated against the United States while residing in
Japan during World War II,and noting that "[c]ircumstances may compel one who
has a dual nationality to do acts which otherwise would not be compatible with the
obligations of American citizenship"); Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 500
(1950) (holding that plaintiff had renounced her citizenship upon becoming an
Italian citizen, and that Congress has appropriate concern with dual nationality). For
a possible "election" requirement, the Court cited Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133,
138 (1952) (specifically noting that in this particular case no statute existed imposing
an election upon the dual national); Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 734
(1952) (noting that "under certain circumstances" a dual national can be deprived of
his United States citizenship through an Act of Congress); Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S.
325, 329 (1939) (holding that a native-born citizen who became a dual national
during minority through his parent's foreign naturalization abroad did not lose his
United States citizenship "provided that on attaining majority he elects to retain that
citizenship and return to the United States to assume its duties"). See Flournoy, Dual
Nationality and Election, 30 YALE L.. 545, 693 (1921). Since Congress has not
provided the machinery for such individuals to make such an election, the Court
eliminated the dual nationality problem in Belle! by utilizing the only machinery Congress had provided-revocation of citizenship. 401 U.S. at 833.
If we assume that revocation on a condition subsequent is wrong, then what
about the problem of dual nationality? To alleviate this problem in some measure,
there has been enunciated a doctrine called "primary nationality" or "primary allegiance," which holds that although a dual national is required to discharge his duties
of allegiance to both States with whose nationality he is clothed, he must give preference
to the duties he owes the State in which he resides. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 18,
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The statutory development . . . reveals a careful consideration by
the Congress of the problems attendant upon dual nationality of a person born abroad. This was purposeful and not accidental. It was legislation structured with care and in the light of then apparent problems.
The solution to the dual nationality dilemma provided by the Congress by way of required residence surely is not unreasonable. 118
The Bellei Court dismissed Schneider on the ground that Mrs.
Schneider possessed Fourteenth Amendment citizenship," 09 whereas
Bellei did not. However, the holding in Schneider was based not on
the Fourteenth Amendment Citizenship Clause, but upon the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause, making that decision applicable

where Afroyim is inapplicable. In view of the fact that the Perez
"rational nexus" test was enunciated six years prior to Schneider, and
that Perez has since been overruled by Afroyim, it must be contended that Schneider superseded Perez and that therefore the issue
of whether the exercise of congressional power in Bellei was so ar-

bitrary and discriminatory as to violate due process should have been
submitted to the test of Schneider. The comparative fact situations
of Schneider and Bellei would seem to indicate that if the balancing
test had been utilized, Bellei would have obtained a result similar to

that reached in Schneider.

20

§ 310(a); 2 HYDE, supra note 6, § 372. The tribunals established pursuant to the
Peace Treaty with Italy in 1947 have resolved several scores of cases of conflict of
nationality laws by reference to the principle of "primary nationality" as an international doctrine. Perhaps the best known of these is the Merg6 Claim, 22 I.L.R. 443
(United States Conciliation Commission, 1955), in which plaintiff was a United States
national through jus soli and an Italian national by marriage. The tribunal held that
plaintiff, by her habitual residence outside the United States and by other conduct had
evidenced her intention to be effectively an Italian national. Applying this principle
to the plaintiff Bellei, dual citizenship ceases to be a difficult problem from the policy
standpoint discussed by the Court. Simply stated, Bellei's "primary allegiance" would
have been to Italy until he assumed residence in the United States, at which time that
allegiance would change.
118. 401 U.S. at 833. Justice Black's comment seems quite apt:
The Court today holds that Congress can indeed rob a citizen of his citizenship
just so long as five members of this court can satisfy themselves that the congressional action was not "unreasonable, arbitrary," "misplaced or arbitrary," or
"irrational or arbitrary or unfair." My first comment is that not one of these
"tests" appears in the Constitution. Id. at 837 (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 822.
120. This conclusion is bottomed on the premise that citizenship, once acquired, even
non-Fourteenth Amendment citizenship, is a "fundamental right." The Court in
Trop v. Dulles accepted this premise: "As long as a person does not voluntarily renounce or abandon his citizenship . . . his fundamental right of citizenship is secure."
356 U.S. 86, 93 (1958) (emphasis added). And Chief Justice Warren argued persuasively in his dissent in Perez that:

19723

NOTES

However, such speculation is now quite irrelevant; rather the focus
should be on why the Court returned to the Perez test when Schneider's balancing test would seem to be the correct precedent. The
single answer is that the Court chose this test to obtain a desired result. The majority chose to examine the congressional purposes of
the statute and to ignore the language. In so doing the Court interpreted the statute as it should have been written rather than as it
actually was written:
A contrary holding would convert what is congressional generosity into something unanticipated and obviously undesired by the
Congress. Our National Legislature indulged the foreign-born child
with presumptive citizenship, subject to subsequent satisfaction of a
reasonable residence requirement, rather than to deny him citizenship
outright, as concededly it had the power to do, and relegate the child,
if he desired American citizenship, to the more arduous requirements
of the usual naturalization process. The plaintiff here would force
the Congress to choose between unconditional conferment of United
States citizenship at birth and deferment of citizenship until a condition precedent is fulfilled. We are not convinced that the Con121
stitution requires so rigid a choice.
It is apparent that the Court took a poorly written law and so construed it as to give it its anticipated meaning. Indeed, what has in
effect been done is to create a special class of immigrant. This faI cannot believe that a government conceived in the spirit of ours was established
with power to take from the people their most basic right.
Citizenship is man's basic right for it is nothing less than the right to have
rights. 356 U.S. at 64.
See also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 186 (1963) (concurring
opinion); Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 676-79 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 167 (1943) (Rutledge, J.,
concurring); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 703 (1898). The origin
of this doctrine of citizenship as a fundamental right may be traced to Chief Justice
Marshall's dictum in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
738 (1824), to the effect that there are certain rights of American citizenship and the
"Constitution does not authorize Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights." Id.
at 827. If citizenship is a fundamental right, then it would seem that the constitutionality of congressional revocation of citizenship should "be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (state and federal one year residency requirements to receive welfare assistance held violative of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection,
the right of interstate movement, and the Fifth Amendment due process).
121. 401 U.S. at 835. The intent of Congress in demanding five years residency
was thought to be in part the encouragement of acculturation in America's institutions,
ideals, and way of life, thereby assuring the assumption of the responsibilities as
well as the benefits of American citizenship. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REc. 7340-41,
7348 (1934). The congressional debates preceding enactment of the 1940 and 1952
Acts do not refute such an interpretation.
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vored immigrant is given the right to come to this country as a citizen at any time prior to his twenty-third birthday, at which time he
must fulfill the residence obligation required of all immigrants. 2
The Court said of this "immigrant":
The proper emphasis is on what the statute permits him to gain from
the possible starting point of non-citizenship, not on what he claims
to lose from the possible starting point of full citizenship to which he
1 23
has no constitutional right in the first place.
It would thus seem that this Court is far more concerned with the
practical effect its decision might have on Congress, than it is with
24
stare decisis.
The apparent reason for the departure of Bellei from the Schneider
and Afroyim decisions is the change in the composition of the Court.
Schneider, Afroyim and their predecessors were carried by five man
majorities, 1 25 including then Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black
and Douglas. Of these, only Justice Douglas remains; the majority
now controlling in Bellei is the result of the addition of Chief Justice
Burger and the author of the opinion, Justice Blackmun. 12' The
decision engineered by this new majority stands as a monument of
contrived uncertainty in the fundamental area of citizenship. Certainly such a cherished right deserves more protection, and it is strongly
urged that Congress re-evaluate citizenship by naturalization. Rather
than create classes of citizens, it is suggested that Congress define those with an absolute right to citizenship, and that individuals
such as Bellei, instead of receiving conditional citizenship, be given a
preferred right to immigrate.
David R. Chaffee

122. A five year residence requirement prior to naturalization is imposed on aliens
by 8 U.S.C.§ 1427(a)(1) (1970).
123. 401 U.S. at 836.
124. The plaintiff here would force the Congress to choose between unconditional conferment of United States citizenship at birth and deferment of citizenship
until a condition precedent is fulfilled. We are not convinced that the Constitution requires so rigid a choice. If it does, the congressional response seems
obvious. 401 U.S. at 835.
125. Schneider: Chief Justice Warren, Justices Douglas, Black, Stewart, Goldberg.
Dissent: Justices Clark, Harlan, White. Afroyim: Chief Justice Warren, Justices
Douglas, Black, Brennan, Fortas. Dissent: Justices Harlan, Clark, Stewart, White.
126. Bellei: Chief Justice Burger, Justices Blackmun, Stewart, White, Harlan. Dissent: Justices Black, Douglas, Marshall, Brennan.

